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The cause which leads to practically very striking unemployment is, essentially and 
in principle, temporary. Therefore, we can only explain transitory unemployment - 
and mainly as a frictional phenomenon - but not other kinds of unemployment. This 
result is not sufficient, but it is not without value. It doubtlessly explains a good 
deal of the phenomenon of unemployment, in my opinion its better half. 
(Schumpeter [1911] 2002, p. 120) 
 
 
It follows from our model that, basically, cyclical unemployment is technological 
unemployment ... It further follows that, like profits, technological unemployment 
is ephemeral. It might, nevertheless, be ever present, but, as in the case of profits, 
every individual source of it in the industrial organism tends to exhaust itself, while 
new ones emerge periodically. In the same sense as profits, moreover, it may be 
called frictional, since instantaneous adaptation of the system would kill it at birth.  
                                                                                                  (Schumpeter 1939, pp. 515-16)   
 
 
1   Introduction 
Until fairly recently it was a common procedure to classify unemployment as seasonal, frictional, 
cyclical  and  structural.  The  distinctions  referred  to  different  causes  and  duration  of 
unemployment  that  coexist  in  varying  degrees.  With  the  breakthrough  of  dynamic  general 
equilibrium modelling, unemployment has been reduced, in macroeconomic theory at least, to a 
purely frictional phenomenon. Looking back as far as the first half of the 20th Century, one 
might be tempted to say: It’s all in Schumpeter! In his theory of economic development Joseph 
A. Schumpeter explained cyclical, structural and other types of unemployment as effects of one 
and the same cause, namely creative destruction. This led him to define unemployment in all its 
manifestations largely as a frictional phenomenon.
1  
However,  while  Schumpeter’s  theory  of  creative  destruction  is  widely  known,  little 
attention  has  been  paid  to  his  views  on  unemployment.  The  sparse  literature  that  connects 
Schumpeterian theory with unemployment has developed in three rounds. The first round was 
started by Lange in his review of Schumpeter (1939). Lange (1941, pp. 192-93) criticized that 
Schumpeter, in contrast with Keynes (1936), lacked a theory that relates employment changes to 
economic fluctuations. This criticism was largely accepted at the time, but sparked off defensive 
                                                 
1  Seasonal unemployment is an exception to the extent that it follows from creative destruction by nature, 
not by entrepreneurs.   2 
reactions  Bennion (1943), Stolper (1943) and Fels (1952), as well as Clemence and Doody 
(1950, ch. 8). Bennion and Fels attempted to remedy the alleged shortcoming in Schumpeter’s 
business cycle model by grafting a Keynesian-type saving-investment apparatus upon it. Stolper 
claimed that Schumpeter’s theory of unemployment is implicit in the latter’s proposition that the 
economy will converge to full-employment equilibrium unless wages are not flexible. Clemence 
and  Doody  argued  that  employment  changes  cannot  be  the  primary  datum  in  Schumpeter’s 
framework  because  it  is  based  on  the  assumption  of  shifting  production  functions  that 
continuously destroy the link between employment and output.  
After a long interval, the discussion of Schumpeter’s approach to unemployment was 
resumed  in  the  early  1980s,  motivated  by  his  centenary  and  by  the  renewed  interest  in 
technological unemployment  as  a byproduct of  long  waves  in  economic development.  After 
discussing the critical treatment of Ricardo’s machinery problem in Schumpeter ([1926] 1934, 
ch. 6; 1954, part III, ch. 6),  Kalmbach and Kurz (1986, p. 91) concluded that Schumpeter was 
unable  to  give  satisfactory  explanations  of  the  effects  of  the  introduction  of  labour-saving 
methods on employment and real wages and that he “wanted to escape a discussion” about the 
repercussion of technological progress on the economic system. Hammond (1984, pp. 66-68) 
suggested that the fact that Schumpeter ([1942] 1952, ch. 5) approved of unemployment relief 
implies that he interpreted unemployment as “involuntary” phenomenon, but Hammond did not 
substantiate  this  with  an  examination  of  Schumpeter`s  other  writings  on  unemployment.  
Freeman, Clark and Soete (1982) wrote that, although Schumpeter’s theory of innovation-driven 
business cycles helps to explain the increasing unemployment of the 1980s, “Schumpeter had 
relatively little to say about unemployment and wages” (p. 21). In their view, Schumpeter (1939) 
explained the higher levels of unemployment typical of the Kondratieff downswings with the 
general demand deficiencies that are associated with low profitability and investment, and not 
with changes in the rates of job creation and destruction associated with a particular level of 
investment. Later on, in a survey about employment and technical change Petit (1995, p. 370) 
stated  that  Schumpeter  made  major  contributions  to economic  theory  in  the  1930s,  but  that 
“these did not directly address the whole issue of technological change and employment”.  
The literature in the two first rounds was thus largely critical of (if at all acquainted with) 
Schumpeter’s  view  that  unemployment  is  a  friction  which  occurs  in  the  process  of  creative 
destruction, when production factors are reallocated from contracting to expanding units. Yet 
much of the current literature on growth and employment conforms with this view, influenced by 
the  Neo-Schumpeterian  approach  which  has  been  developed  since  the  early  1990s,  with 
significant  contributions  by  Aghion,    Howitt  (1994,  1998),  Caballero  and  Hammour  (1994, 
1996),  Pissarides  (1990),  Postel-Vinay  (2002),  Francois  and  Lloyd-Ellis  (2003,  2005),  and 
Caballero  (2007).  Combining  endogenous-growth  theory  in  the  spirit  of  Romer  (1986)  with 
search  and  matching  in  the  labour  market  à  la  Pissarides  (1990),  the  Neo-Schumpeterian 
approach puts the emphasis on quality-improving innovations that make old products and old 
firms obsolete. The implications of such creative destruction for labour market dynamics are 
derived from the view that match formation and dissolution requires time and resources.  
While Schumpeter’s ideas about growth and innovation have been a source of inspiration 
for  the  new  paradigm,  modern  authors  rarely,  if  ever,  refer  to  Schumpeter’s  discussion  of 
unemployment issues. The only passages often mentioned are Schumpeter’s ([1942] 1952, p. 83) 
concept of “creative destruction” (see e.g. Francois and Lloyd-Ellis 2003, p. 530), and his related 
remark about depressions and cyclical unemployment as “the means to reconstruct each time the 
economic system on a more efficient plan” (Schumpeter [1934] 1951, p. 113; see e.g. Howitt   3 
1994, p. 765). Postel-Vinay’s (2002, p. 738, n. 2) assertion that Schumpeter did not specifically 
connect the notion of creative destruction to the unemployment problem is just as illustrative of 
the limits of the modern reception of Schumpeter as Howitt’s (1994, p. 768) brief history of the 
notion of technological unemployment that refers to Ricardo (1821) and Wicksell ([1901] 1934), 
but not to Schumpeter.  
Time seems ripe to reassess Schumpeter’s approach to unemployment. The present paper 
provides, for the first time in the literature, a comprehensive investigation of the evolution of 
Schumpeter’s  interpretation  of  unemployment  phenomena.  In  the  next  section  we  show  that 
Schumpeter’s concern with unemployment was often part of his overall discussion of the welfare 
effects of economic development. Section 3 examines Schumpeter’s theory of unemployment as 
displayed particularly in chapter 9, section D of his 1939 book and in a 1927 German article on 
controversies  about  unemployment  benefits,  the  only  two  pieces  written  by  him  with 
“(un)employment”  in  the  title.  Schumpeter’s  reflections  about  the  policy  implications  of  his 
unemployment  views  are  discussed  in  section  4.  That  section  also  addresses  Schumpeter’s 
interpretation of the role of wage rigidities, which are of marginal relevance to his core model of 
economic  fluctuations  but  become  important  under  particular  circumstances.  Section  5 
summarizes  the  different  types  of  unemployment  in  Schumpeter’s  taxonomy  and  compares 
Schumpeter’s views systematically with those of the Neo-Schumpeterians. Section 6 concludes.    
 
2  Technological Progress and Welfare 
The Theory of Economic Development 
The starting-point for studying the evolution of Schumpeter’s unemployment theory is chapter 7 
of the first (1911) edition of his classic book. That chapter was omitted from the second (1926) 
German  edition,  on  which the  1934  English  translation  was  based.  It became  known  in the 
literature as “the lost chapter” (Shionoya 1997), and was eventually translated into English in 
2002. It included a section about “an important special case”, discussing the implications of 
labour-saving technical change for the trend of employment and real wages along the path of 
economic development (Schumpeter [1911] 2002, pp. 117-20). Although chapter 6 of the 1911 
edition was about “The nature of economic crises”, it barely mentioned unemployment. In the 
second edition Schumpeter changed the title of chapter 6 to “Der Zyklus der Konjunktur” (“The 
business  cycle”)  and  revised  it  extensively.  Of  particular  interest  is  the  new  section  5 
(Schumpeter [1926] 1934, pp. 241-51), which inquires how “the process of depression runs its 
course in a state of nearly complete lack of development; the process of depression as a fulfiller; 
the different categories of economic agents in the depression; the real wage in prosperity and 
depression”.
2 Those last two subsections evolved from the 1911 “special case” section, together 
with another section (Schumpeter [1911] 2002, pp. 109-17), titled “The effect of development on 
the different economic agents”. Their subject is the same, that is, the theoretical investigation of 
the effects of “economic development” on the welfare of economic agents, particularly workers.   
Schumpeter ([1911] 2002, pp. 111-12; [1926] 1934, pp. 232, 248) argued that the new 
demand of entrepreneurs for means of production in the upswing brings about higher demand for 
labour and money wages. However, because of the rising price level, workers “often do not gain 
a whole lot” in the prosperity phase ([1911] 2002, p. 114). In the downswing, when the new 
                                                 
2  This is described in the detailed table of contents of the 1926 edition, which is excluded from the 1934 
translation.   4 
products become available, prices fall and the entrepreneurial profit of the previous boom is, 
according to his pure model without unemployment, transformed into higher real incomes of the 
primary factors labour and land ([1911] 2002, pp. 114-15; [1926] 1934, p. 249). Such an increase 
in both real wage rates and the aggregate real wage bill of workers is “much more important than 
the rise in their money incomes in the period of upswing” ([1911] 2002, p. 115). Schumpeter 
observed that his conclusion about the positive long-run effects of technical progress on real 
income agreed with the prevailing opinion among economists: “It is widely accepted that the 
basic fact which explains the influence of development on wages and rents is the following: 
Through the influence of development labour and land will produce more goods than before. 
Hence, in the long-run all permanent achievements of developments either increase wages or 
rents” ([1911] 2002, pp. 116-17).
3 
There is, however, a relevant exception to that result, as Schumpeter ([1911] 2002, p. 
117) pointed out in his discussion of the “important special case”. The new companies that carry 
out  the  “reorganization  of  the  economy  towards  efficiency”  can  either  be  designed  to  cut 
production  costs  through  a  more  effective  organization,  or  they  can  produce  new  means  of 
production “which have a saving effect”. In both cases, the first impact is an increase in the 
demand for primary factors to produce the new goods, but in the latter case this is followed by a 
reduction in the demand for labour and land when the new means of production are applied to 
production and “compete” with the primary factors. As stressed by Schumpeter (p. 118), the 
crucial point is not the technical reduction of costs per se, but the decline of the demand for 
labour and land caused by it. That was exactly the problem discussed by Ricardo (1821) in his 
path-breaking chapter “On Machinery”.  
The Machinery Problem 
The machinery problem had attracted Schumpeter’s attention even before writing his Theory of 
Economic Development. Already in his first book, which dealt with economics largely from a 
static  equilibrium  standpoint,  Schumpeter  (1908,  pp.  516-18)  claimed  that  the  use  of  the 
“variation  method”  should take  the analysis  of  the effects of  technical  progress  further  than 
Ricardo’s original analysis and the inconclusive controversy that followed it. He argued that the 
matter  must  be  treated  as  part  of  the  field  of  “dynamics”,  since  “a  main  cause  of  the 
inconclusiveness  of  the  controversy  is  certainly  the  failure  to  distinguish  between  the 
‘immediate’ and the ‘indirect’ effects, between the short and long periods” (p. 517). Schumpeter 
(1908) did not, however, explain how exactly comparative statics could improve on the classical 
treatment of the machinery problem. In 1911 he would bring into the picture the role of wage 
changes  as  an  equilibrating  mechanism,  but  it  would  be only  after the  publication  of  Hicks 
(1932) that matters became clear to Schumpeter, as discussed below. 
Schumpeter  ([1911]  2002,  p.  118)  started  his  analysis  of  the  machinery  problem  in  
chapter 7 by stating that the effect of the introduction of labour-saving methods in a particular 
industry depends on the elasticity of the supply and demand curves for that good. “We saw that 
any  decline  of  the  rate  of  interest  necessarily  brings  new  entrepreneurs  into  action.  This 
necessarily makes new combinations possible, and leads to their realization. For the same reason, 
a decline in the prices of the original means of production must have a similar effect. Here the 
                                                 
3  See Boianovsky and Hagemann (2005, p. 90, n. 5) for evidence that Marshall, Clark, Cassel and Walras 
believed that higher real wages would accompany the increase in output brought about by technical 
progress. Wicksell was the sole exception in the neoclassical period.   5 
decline [in the demand for primary factors] finds its effective break – it cannot go further” (p. 
119).  This  “dynamic”  marginalist argument  implies  that  the  fall  in real  wages  increases  the 
profitability  of  old  labour-intensive  technology  and  leads  to  the  reabsorption  of  displaced 
workers, as first elaborated by Wicksell in his 1901 Lectures. Schumpeter neither referred to 
Wicksell  nor  realized  the  full  implications  of  the  1911  “counterweight”  argument.
4  Yet  his 
conclusions are similar to Wicksell’s in that “the freed workers would push towards bringing the 
wage down, but would have to find employment at the lower wage” (pp. 119-20). Labour-saving 
innovations may reduce real wages permanently, but the fall in employment can be temporary 
only.  
In the later editions, Schumpeter ([1926] 1934, pp. 250-51) came back to the machinery 
problem in the new chapter 6, now mixing two different kinds of argument: the compensation 
view, based on Say’s law, and the marginalist perspective based on wage changes. According to 
Schumpeter, the reduction of labour demand due to mechanization cannot be permanent, because 
“the expenditure of that part of entrepreneurial profit which is not annihilated by the fall in prices 
necessarily more than prevents any lasting shrinkage” (p. 251). He immediately qualified that 
statement by pointing out that there is only one way economic development can permanently 
reduce labour demand: “If in the new combinations it shifts the relative marginal significance of 
labour  and  land  which  obtained  in  the  old  productive  combinations  sufficiently  to  the 
disadvantage of labour”. This will cause a permanent fall of the absolute amount and share of 
labor in aggregate income, but not in the employment level.  
Although Schumpeter did not mention Wicksell in that connection, he would later refer 
to  Hicks’s  (1932,  ch.  6)  marginalist  analysis  of  the distribution  effects of  technical  change, 
which was explicitly based on Wicksell. As observed by Schumpeter (1939, pp. 80, 574), a 
labour-saving innovation – in Hicks’s sense of an increase in the marginal productivity of capital 
relative to labour at a given capital-labour ratio – tends to lower real wages and the wage share, 
but  its effect  on the  wage  bill  depends on the  elasticity  of  substitution  between  labour  and 
capital. This is different from Schumpeter’s inconclusive attempts, in both editions of the Theory 
of Economic Development, to apply marginal analysis to the machinery problem. “We therefore 
meet again the problem of machinery and labour... But we meet it now in its fundamental aspect, 
for technological unemployment is but a special and, moreover, as we have seen, a temporary 
form  of  the  effect  of  technological  improvement  on  the  wage  bill”  (ibidem).  Schumpeter’s 
enthusiasm for Hicks’s framework is even more evident in the section about “distributive shares 
and technological advances” in the History of Economic Analysis, where he wrote that the 19th 
century  controversy  about  the  machinery  problem,  in  the  form  of  arguments  pro  and  con 
compensation, is “dead and buried” and “vanished from scene as a better technique filtered into 
general use” (1954, p. 684; see also [1942] 1952, p. 36). 
The Downswing of the Cycle 
Apart from the machinery problem, there was, according to Schumpeter ([1911] 2002, p. 120; 
[1926] 1934, pp. 249-50), another factor that should be taken into account in evaluating the 
welfare effects of economic development: the downswing of the business cycle.  
                                                 
4  Wicksell’s Lectures were originally published in Swedish. Volume I was translated into German in 
1913 and into English in 1934 only. On Wicksell’s discussion of Ricardo’s machinery problem see 
Boianovsky and Hagemann (2005).    6 
We also know of a second reason for unemployment. During times of crises, almost 
always  workers  become  unemployed  in  the  normal  process  of  liquidation  and 
reorganization.  Yet  no  one  doubts  the  temporary  character  of  this  kind  of 
unemployment. It is often very serious. It is in practice much more important than 
the one mentioned before. But it is only a special case of the comprehensive effects 
of depression, which affects all classes of society in principally the same way, and 
which disappears by itself together with the depression. ([1911] 2002, p. 120) 
Despite the increase of the real wage rate in the depression, real income of workers falls during 
that period because of temporary unemployment caused by three factors ([1926] 1934, pp. 249-
50).
5 First, the uncertainty created by the disturbance of equilibrium and change in data in the 
boom makes it impossible to old and new firms alike to plan safely for the future, and therefore 
“upsets many firms and reduces others to idleness for a time. This must result among other 
things in unemployment, the essentially temporary character of which does not alter the fact that 
it is a great and under certain circumstances annihilating misfortune for those concerned” (see 
also [1910] 2005, p. 42). The second cause of unemployment is the elimination or contraction of 
old firms by the appearance of new and more productive firms. As Schumpeter ([1910] 2005, p. 
41) pointed out, in the depression “the evaluations of the static economic agents continue to 
prove a failure – their returns also change; this makes a readjustment of all net assets necessary, 
and this readjustment expresses itself in its part in taking away from or adding to the previous 
assets”, with ensuing devaluation and obsolescence of old capital goods. Schumpeter’s stress on 
the difficulty of workers to adjust to changes in the labour market seems to have been influenced 
by Marx: “As far as [the primary factors] have difficulties with the transition to other uses – this 
is what Marx emphasized so heavily – then a phenomenon of economic friction is embedded in 
there” ([1911] 2002, p. 116). Finally, unemployment will also go up in the downswing because 
of the diminished labour demand associated with the completion of investments in new capital 
goods  started  in  the  boom  ([1926]  1934,  p.  250).  This  introduces  into  the  analysis  an 
intertemporal coordination problem, but Schumpeter did not pursue it.  
The Stationarity of Long-Run Unemployment 
Except for the “qualification” represented by the possibility of permanent negative effects of 
labour-saving  innovations  on  real  wages,  Schumpeter  reaffirmed  the  conclusion  of  his  1911 
chapter 7, arguing that the unemployment of the cyclical downswing is part of the “temporary 
reactions” which overshadow the economic nature of depression as a process of “diffusion of the 
achievements  of  the  boom  over  the  whole  economic  system  through  the  mechanism  of  the 
struggle for equilibrium” ([1926] 1934, p. 251).The long-run rate of unemployment is stationary, 
a prediction that, according to Schumpeter, had been confirmed by data (Schumpeter [1942] 
1952, p. 69; see also 1939, p. 516). The series mentioned by Schumpeter can be found as chart 
XX of his 1939 Business Cycles (p. 512). He would later claim that the stationarity of long-run 
unemployment is also a feature of the series up to 1929 (Schumpeter [1946] 1951, p. 200), which 
led  him  to  stress  once  again  the  positive  welfare  effects  of  economic  development:  “[T]he 
capitalist  process  has  always  absorbed,  at  increasing  real  wage  rates,  not  only  the 
                                                 
5 Lange (1941, p. 193) criticized Schumpeter’s (1939) “pure model” of the business cycle for stating that 
output falls in the boom and goes up in the recession, and suggested that the explanation for the 
observed  fall  of  output  in  recessions is the  fluctuation  of  employment. However, this is  precisely 
Schumpeter’s argument in chapter 6 of his [1926] 1934 book.    7 
unemployment it generated but also the increasing population” (ibidem, italics in the original). 
 
 
3  Frictions, Disequilibrium and the Normal Rate of Unemployment  
Schumpeter’s Taxonomy 
It is obvious from the opening quotation of this paper that the early Schumpeter considered his 
purely  frictional  explanation  of  unemployment  to  be  incomplete,  as  “the  phenomenon  of 
unemployment with the means of pure theory, i.e. from the essence of the economic mechanism, 
cannot be explained without an unexplained remainder” ([1911] 2002, p. 119). Over time this 
caution would give way to a more integrated view in which Schumpeter would use a wide notion 
of frictions as the base of a new taxonomy of unemployment.  
In order to understand the variety of factors that affect the unemployment time series, 
Schumpeter (1939, ch. 9, section D) introduced a new taxonomy. Although his classification of 
unemployment can be seen as a critical reaction to Keynes’s (1936, ch. 2) better-known division 
into  frictional,  voluntary  and  involuntary  unemployment,  Schumpeter’s  purpose  was  mainly 
empirical. According to Schumpeter (1939, pp. 511-17), the phenomena should be grouped into 
two  broad  sets:  (i)  unemployment  in  the  “neighborhoods  of  equilibrium”,  called  “normal 
unemployment”;  and  (ii)  unemployment  that  is  characteristic  of  economic  fluctuations  in 
disequilibrium, subdivided into “disturbance unemployment” (caused by factors external to the 
firm), and “technological unemployment” (arising from disturbances by innovation within the 
system).
6  
The phrase  “normal unemployment” had been used earlier by Hicks (1932, ch. 3) to 
describe forms of unemployment that do not represent excess supply in the labor market  and that 
therefore do not put downward pressure on the wage rate. Schumpeter was probably influenced 
by  Hicks,  but  the  meaning  is  not  the  same.  Schumpeter  (1939,  p.  511)  defined  normal 
unemployment as “the unemployment that would at any point exist if the system had already 
reached  the  neighborhood  of  equilibrium  toward which  it  is  tending”.  It  comprises  seasonal 
unemployment, unemployability, change of residence, occupation or job, and “imperfections of 
competition or of equilibrium”. Disequilibrium unemployment may be “supernormal” (above 
equilibrium) or “subnormal” (below equilibrium). The rate of normal unemployment is not an 
independent  quantity  that  could  be  added  to  separate  segments  of  unemployment,  but  the 
“percentage  of  workers  unemployed  which  would  exist  in  the  absence  of  disturbances  of 
equilibrium”  (p.  513), i.e.  the rate  observed when the  business  cycle  is  passing  through the 
neighbourhood of equilibrium.
7  
Another  category  that  Schumpeter  sometimes  included  into  normal  unemployment  is 
“vicarious unemployment”. He defined it as the unemployment that in imperfect competition 
“takes the place of adaptation of wages” to the rate of normal unemployment that would be 
achieved  under  perfect  competitive  conditions  (p.  513),  assuming  that  the  new  data  last 
throughout  the  period  in  question.  A  case  in  point  is  Schumpeter’s  (1939,  pp.  838-42) 
interpretation of output fluctuations in the US economy in the 1920s. The business cycle was not 
generated or affected by an excessively high wage level, since (within limits) a wage level that 
                                                 
6 Schumpeter’s 1939 taxonomy did not make an impact on the literature, possibly because it was just a 
short section in a book of 1095 pages. Clemence and Doody (1950, p. 59) called it a “highly suggestive 
analysis” but did not explain why.  
7 As an example Schumpeter selected the year 1897, when unemployment in England was at 3.3 per cent.   8 
persists through a decade “becomes a datum to which the system will in general adapt itself 
without changing its mode of working”. One of the forms of adaptation is the replacement of 
labor by capital, with ensuing unemployment but relatively steady output.  
The  kind  of  unemployment  that  is  essentially  associated  with  business  cycles  is, 
according  to  Schumpeter  (pp.  514-15),  related  to  technical  progress.  He  used  the  phrase 
“technological  unemployment”  in  his  Business  Cycles  (1939)  to  describe  not  only  the 
displacement of workers by machinery (as in [1926] 1934, p. 250), but all employment effects of 
labour reallocation induced by creative destruction through innovations – i.e. by changes in the 
production functions and by the replacement of old by new firms. It is the priority of this broad 
concept of technological unemployment that sets Schumpeter apart from the rest of the economic 
literature: 
Few, if any, economists realize the one major point that the writer wishes to make. 
They  have  a  habit  of  distinguishing  between,  and  contrasting,  cyclical  and 
technological unemployment. But it follows from our model that, basically, cyclical 
unemployment is technological unemployment. Technological unemployment… is 
of the essence of our process and, linking up as it does with innovation, is cyclical 
by nature.  
(1939, p. 515; italics in the original; see also [1926] 1934, p. 250)  
Frictions and Imperfections 
Also in contrast with much of the contemporaneous literature, Schumpeter associated the notion 
of frictions not just with normal unemployment (as Hicks 1932 had done). He also applied it to 
cyclical “technological unemployment”, which emerges because the adaptation of the system to 
a new equilibrium is not instantaneous (1939, pp. 515-16; cf. [1926] 1934, p. 238).
8 The word 
“friction” is interpreted not only in the sense of time-consuming job search (as in [1926] 1934, p. 
250), but in the wider meaning of lags in the convergence to equilibrium. The lags are caused by 
costs incident to change of occupation or shift from the production of one sort or quality of 
commodity to another, by transactions costs, resistance to price changes, long-term contracts, or 
by the difficulty of “persuading oneself or other people to act” (1939, p. 50).  
While Schumpeter (1911, ch. 7) had suggested that frictions could account for only part 
of the observed unemployment, he thus gradually moved to the position that economic frictions 
provided an explanation for most, if not all, of it. This is clear from his rejection of Keynes’s 
indictment that “classical” economists knew of no unemployment other than frictional (Keynes 
1936, ch. 2).  
We are free, of course, to define the concept of frictional unemployment so widely 
as  to  include  technological  unemployment  and  also  the  other  types  of 
unemployment that were recognised – mainly: unemployment from imperfections 
of  competition;  unemployment  from  monetary  causes;  and  unemployment  from 
business fluctuations, whatever their cause – but then the indictment loses its force 
                                                 
8 The first economist to incorporate frictions into the analysis of economic systems was Pareto (1897). In 
his  attempt  to  build  a  formal  business  cycle  model,  he  compared  them  to  the  role  of  inertia  in 
mechanics;  see  Boianovsky  and  Tarascio  (1998).  Bennion  (1943,  pp.  346-47)  realized  that 
Schumpeter’s notion of frictions was not the traditional one. However, his interpretation of the word 
“frictional” in the key passage on p. 515 of the Business Cycles – as the time interval before investment 
reaches its full employment level – is a distorting effort to interpret Schumpeter in Keynesian terms.   9 
for, thus defined, friction is no longer an obviously inadequate explanation of the 
observed facts of unemployment. (1954, p. 944, n. 57; italics in the original) 
Schumpeter  ([1911]  2002,  p.  119,  n.  20)  had  mentioned  Beveridge  (1909)  as  a  standard 
reference. While Beveridge indeed was the first in the English literature to emphasize the pivotal 
role of frictions in the labour market (Boianovsky and Trautwein 2003, pp. 390-91), he did not, 
however,  claim  that  frictions  could  explain  (nearly)  all  unemployment.
9  Schumpeter’s 
counterattack  may  thus  be  understood  as  a  defence  of  his  own  approach  against  Keynes’s 
concept  of  “un(der)employment  equilibrium”.  Schumpeter’s  own  concept  of  “normal 
unemployment” as an equilibrium phenomenon differs from Keynes’s, even if partly motivated 
by the latter’s General Theory (1936). It was based on “imperfections of both competition and 
equilibrium” and implied that “full employment ceases to be a property of equilibrium states” 
(Schumpeter 1939, p. 161). Apart from the frictions mentioned above, such “imperfections” refer 
to  imperfect  competition  in  goods  markets.  The  presence  of  monopolistic  competition  and 
nominal price rigidity means that the economy has a tendency to move into equilibrium with 
excess capacity and unemployment (pp. 66-67).  
Along  similar  lines,  Schumpeter  (1926/27)  had  argued  that  “rationalization”  of  the 
productive process (in the sense of a combination of substitution of machinery for labour and 
“Taylorization”)  could  cause  not  just  temporary,  but  permanent  unemployment,  if  the 
assumption of free competition was replaced by “quasi-monopolistic” market structures. In terms 
of  the  1939  framework  this  could  be  expressed  as  an  increase  of  the  normal  rate  of 
unemployment. However, from the point of view of the dynamic process typical of depressions 
associated  with  widespread  falling  demand,  observed  short-run  price  rigidity  in  the  cyclical 
downswing is stabilizing, because of its positive effects on the financial strength of firms and 
hence by avoiding “chaos in their markets”.
10   
Whereas Schumpeter conceived of a two-phase cycle formed by “prosperity” (departure 
from equilibrium) and “recession” (return to equilibrium) in his first approximation (1939, ch. 
4.A),  he  further  moved  (ch.  4.B)  to  a  four-phase  cycle  divided  into  prosperity,  recession, 
depression  and  recovery.  In  the  two-phase  cycle  the  system  does  not  fall  below  normal,  in 
contrast with the overshooting of equilibrium when passing from recession to depression in the 
four-phase cycle. Schumpeter’s unemployment taxonomy applies better to the four-phase cycle. 
During the depression phase employment will decline at a decreasing rate until recovery point is 
reached (1939, p. 209).        
According to Schumpeter (1939, p. 518; 1952, p. 283) the main reason why Keynes and other 
economists  had  separated  cyclical  from  technological  unemployment  was  their  focus  on  the 
Kitchin cycles of 40 months’ length, instead of taking into account the Juglar cycles of 9 years’ 
length and especially the “Kondratieff long-waves” that span six decades. In Keynes’s case, this 
is explained by his short-run assumption of given production methods. Schumpeter (1939, pp. 
                                                 
9  Darity  (1981-82)  argues  that  Beveridge  (1909)  treated  all  unemployment  as  essentially  frictional. 
However, Beveridge (1907, pp. 68, 71; 1909, chs. iv - v) made clear that frictions are relevant only in 
the  case  of  unemployment  associated  with  sectoral  fluctuations  of  output  that  cause  intersectoral 
movements of labor. Hence, for Beveridge, frictions are essential to understand what he called the 
“irreducible minimum of unemployment”, not the aggregate behavior of unemployment in the time 
series.   
10  As  put  by  Schumpeter  ([1942]  1952,  p.  95),  “perfect  and  universal  flexibility  of  prices  might  in 
depression further unstabilize the system, instead of stabilizing it” (cf. Blanchard and Fischer 1989).    10 
516-18) claimed that a close examination of the unemployment time series for the period before 
the First World War reveals a stable normal rate of unemployment, together with supernormal 
unemployment  in  the  depression  phase  of  the  second  Kondratieff  and  the  presence  of  an 
unemployment peak every nine years, reflecting the “clusters of innovation” typical of the Juglar 
cycle.  
 
4  Wages, Unemployment Benefit, and Policy 
Wages and Unemployment 
The  influence  of  departures  of the  wage  rate  from  its  full-employment  equilibrium  level  on 
labour demand and employment was first discussed by Schumpeter in his 1916/17 article about 
the theory of distribution (pp. 78-80). He introduced a distinction between small variations/short 
periods on one side, and large variations/long periods on the other. In the latter case a higher 
wage rate will induce a different optimal combination of production factors which increases the 
capital-labor ratio, that is, a mechanization of the productive process. The mechanization may 
lead to a larger optimal output and to an upward shift of the demand for capital. The increase in 
the production of capital goods will induce a “secondary demand” for labor, which restores part 
of the original employment level. It is possible that the demand for labor regains its earlier level 
(or even exceeds it), as “very easily, at such a reorganization of production as is involved in a 
mechanization of the production process, completely new possibilities emerge that nobody had 
ever thought of earlier and that further reorganization of the production follows” (p. 79). This 
differs from the short-run effect of small wage increases, which tend to bring about  cuts in 
production and, therefore, in the demand for both capital and labour.  
The distinction between the short-run and long-run effects of wage changes (or resistance 
to  change)  was  carried  over  to  Business  Cycles  e.g.  in  Schumpeter’s  notion  of  vicarious 
unemployment discussed above. “Depression unemployment”, on the other hand, is not decided 
by wage rigidity. The dominant factor in the determination of employment in short-run situations 
of deep economic depression is the downward shift of the firms’ demand curves for labour, 
caused by cyclical shifts in the demand curves for goods. Furthermore, the labour demand curves 
tend to become less elastic in the process of shifting down. Hence, the short-run influence of 
changes in wage rates is not important in Schumpeter’s framework (see 1939, p. 839, n. 1). In the 
particular case of the American labour market in the years following the 1929 crisis, “it is not 
only  likely  that  actual  [wage]  reductions  failed,  for  the  time  being,  to  call  forth  additional 
demand for labour... and that greater reductions would have still more completely failed to do so, 
but there must also have been cases in which reductions of rates simply resulted in a decrease of 
total output and employment” (pp. 953-54). That conclusion does not apply after the economy 
passes the lower turning point and enters the prosperity phase of the cycle. Higher wage rates 
will then contribute to mechanization and prevent a faster increase of employment, as long as 
there is supernormal unemployment (p. 954).  
Although Schumpeter kept elements of the distinction between short-run and long-run 
effects of wage changes that he had introduced in 1916/17, the indeterminacies of that article 
were gone by the time he delivered the Lowell lectures. In the new chapter 28 added to the 
second  edition  of  Capitalism,  Socialism  and  Democracy,  Schumpeter  ([1942]  1952,  p.  386) 
wrote that the labour (and other “anticapitalist”) policies which prevailed in the USA “reduce 
employment below its otherwise possible level by putting an abnormal premium on everybody’s 
employing as little labour as possible – they induce a sort of ‘flight from labour’”. Schumpeter 
clearly referred to the long-run substitution of capital for workers induced by high labour costs –   11 
a process intensified by “cheap money” policy, as pointed out in the Lowell lecture ([1941] 
1991, p. 369).  
 
Unemployment Benefits 
Despite his criticism of “labour policies”, Schumpeter was in favor of unemployment relief as 
the  best  way  to  counteract  the  effects  of  the  business  cycle  on  workers’  welfare.  Having 
described cyclical technological unemployment as “frictional”, Schumpeter (1939, p. 516) was at 
pains to stress that this definition did not indicate any intention to “minimize the importance of 
the phenomenon or the sufferings it inflicts”. He argued nevertheless that the primary interest of 
workers  is  in  the  effects  of  innovation  on  their  long-run  aggregate  income  “and  not  in  the 
incident variations of employment, which is but an element of the mechanism that produces the 
changes of the former and can be separately handled by public policy”. Schumpeter did not 
indicate at the time what exactly he meant by “public policy”, but it is clear from his other 
writings that he aimed at the protection of workers from the effects of temporary unemployment, 
though not generally by way of anti-cyclical stabilization policy. 
The  real  tragedy  is  not  unemployment  per  se,  but  unemployment  plus  the 
impossibility of providing adequately  for the unemployed without impairing the 
conditions  of  further  economic  development:  for  obviously  the  suffering  and 
degradation ... which we associate with unemployment, though not the waste of 
productive resources, would be largely eliminated and unemployment would lose 
practically all its terror if the private life of the unemployed were not seriously 
affected by their unemployment.  ([1942] 1952, p. 70; italics in the original) 
Some  years  earlier,  Schumpeter  (1926/27)  had  defended  unemployment  relief  in  a 
comment  on  the  debate  between  Cassel,  Lederer  and  others  about  its  influence  on  German 
unemployment  in  the  crisis  of  1925/26.  Cassel  (1926)  had  argued  that  technical  change 
(“rationalization”)  would  generally  bring  about  temporary  unemployment  associated  with 
frictions; lack of economic mobility, caused by the “monopolistic policy of trade unions” and by 
government  measures  for  the  relief  of  the  unemployed,  was  the  only  possible  source  of 
permanent unemployment.
11 Cassel’s claim was based on the idea that general overproduction is 
impossible, reducing unemployment to a temporary phenomenon connected with the reallocation 
of workers between different sectors. “From which it follows that the cause of a more than 
temporary unemployment can be found only in circumstances that prevent workers from such 
adjustments” (Schumpeter 1926/27, p. 155; italics in the original). Schumpeter did not reject 
Cassel’s  invocation  of  Say’s  law.  “It  has  been  attempted  innumerable  times  for  more  than 
hundred years to refute this argument [against general overproduction]. However, if understood 
properly, it is irrefutable... But the way from this insight to its practical application is just as long 
as the way from a pure theorem of mechanics to the construction of a bridge...” (ibidem).
12 The 
problem  with  Cassel’s  proposition  rested  elsewhere,  namely  in  his  assumption  of  free 
competition  in  the  goods  market.  Persistent  unemployment  in  Germany  at  the  time  was, 
according to Schumpeter, caused by the dominance of imperfectly competitive firms that made 
                                                 
11 See Boianovsky and Trautwein (2003) for Cassel’s interpretation of unemployment in general.  
12 Schumpeter emphasized on many occasions (see e.g. his 1931 Tokyo lecture; and 1954, pp. 615-25) 
that Say’s law is one of the main building blocks of business cycle theory, since it prevents the wrong 
turn taken by underconsumption theories. However, unlike Cassel, Schumpeter did not regard frictional 
unemployment as a corollary of Say’s law.   12 
the temporary unemployment effects of labor-saving innovations permanent (see also Stolper 
1994, p. 45; McCraw 2007, pp. 175-76).  
From this follows… that Professor Cassel’s argument does not apply, at any rate, to 
the German system of unemployment benefits. Because, if the monopoloid price 
and sales policies are the true cause of persistent unemployment, while we cannot 
abstain from the monopoloid forms of organization, the support of the unemployed 
is just as indispensable an element of our economic order as unemployment itself ... 
This  is  the  reason,  but  the  only  reason,  why  under  present  circumstances  the 
problem  of  unemployment  can  only  be  solved  in  a  planned  economy  –  not 
necessarily a state-led one, though. (1926/27, pp. 159-60; italics in the original) 
Imperfectly competitive structures play an important role in accelerating the pace of technical 
progress, an argument he would elaborate in detail in his discussion of “creative destruction” in 
chapters 7 and 8 of the 1942 book. In his 1926/27 German article Schumpeter, in contrast with 
the discussion in Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (1942) and his 1946 encyclopaedia entry 
about  capitalism  (reproduced  1951),  restricted  his  defence  of  unemployment  benefit  to 
“permanent”  unemployment.  His  later  argument  in  favour  of  unemployment  relief  did  not 
exclude the perverse incentive effects of the kind stressed by Cassel, but assumed that they could 
be minimized by proper management of the unemployment insurance system. 
 
Macroeconomic Policy 
Although  Schumpeter  paid  relatively  more  attention  to  counteracting  the  effects  of 
unemployment  than  attacking  its  causes,  there  was  scope  for  macroeconomic  policy  in  his 
framework. The topic of the last section of chapter 6 of the second 1926 edition of The Theory of 
Economic Development is the “prophylaxis and therapy” of economic crises. While depressions, 
by destroying “these existences which are irretrievably associated with the hopeless unadapted” 
([1926] 1934, p. 253), are in principle a necessary feature of the economic development process, 
abnormal depressions that overshoot equilibrium and increase unemployment beyond what is 
“necessary”  ([1925]  1994,  p.  120)  should  be  avoided.  Such  overshooting  is  caused  by  the 
uncertainty that prevails in the downswing, with ensuing “precautionary measures taken on all 
sides”,  perishing  of  “much  of what  is  healthy  and  vigorous”,  and  “temporary  restrictions  of 
production” (ibidem). The same idea may be found in Schumpeter’s ([1942] 1952, p. 90) remark 
that  the  disorganization  of  the  industry  caused  by  the  rapid  change  of  data  in  the  creative 
destruction process may inflict “functionless losses” and “avoidable unemployment”. Economic 
policy should not try to conserve “obsolescent industries indefinitely”, but instead try to “avoid 
their coming down with a crash” and attempt to “turn a rout, which may become a center of 
cumulative depressive effects, into orderly retreat” (ibidem).   
The losses and destruction which accompany the abnormal course of events are 
really  meaningless  and  functionless.  Justification  of  the  various  proposals  for  a 
prophylaxis and therapy of crises chiefly rests with them. The other sound starting 
point for remedial policy is the fact that even the normal – still more the abnormal – 
depression implicates individuals who have nothing to do with the cause and the 
meaning of the cycle, above all the workers.          
                 ([1926] 1934, p. 253; italics in the 
original)   13 
Among the measures suggested by Schumpeter were the postponement of public construction 
projects to periods of depression, and a credit policy that discriminates between businesses made 
obsolete by the boom and those threatened by abnormal depression. The same point of view can 
be found in Schumpeter’s oft cited contribution to the 1934 Harvard volume on The Economics 
of  the  Recovery  Program.  Schumpeter  ([1934]  1951,  p.  115)  had  no  doubts  that  relief  was 
“imperative on moral and social grounds” and important to stabilize demand, but was critical of 
remedies, such as expansionary credit policy, that could prevent the necessary adjustment to 
economic change. The upshot was that “futile as it is to hope for miraculous cures, it is exactly 
wrong to believe that the evils of depression are all of them inevitable and that the only sound 
policy  consists  of  doing  nothing”  (p.  117).  Even  under  the  assumption  that  much  work  of 
reorganization and adaptation is done in the depression and that the latter will find its “natural 
end”, one should not, according to Schumpeter (1939, p. 155), just “let things take their course”. 
It is worth noting that Schumpeter (1926/27, p. 158) argued for public spending as a way to get 
the economy over a “dead point” already in the 1920s, even before its popularization in the 
1930s. It is clear enough that Schumpeter’s conception of economic policy in the depression was 
more sophisticated than the pure “liquidationist” view that is frequently associated with him (see 
De Long 1990; Caballero 2007, p. 192).    
   


























5  Schumpeter and the Neo-Schumpeterians on Unemployment 
Creative Destruction as General Cause 
Our investigation of Schumpeter’s views on unemployment shows that, contrary to widespread   14 
opinion,  Schumpeter  had  a  rather  sophisticated  understanding  of  how  different  types  of 
unemployment could develop from one and the same cause, namely creative destruction. Our 
figure (above) displays the systemic relations between the different types of unemployment in 
Schumpeter’s  taxonomy,  as  explained  in  the  previous  sections.  His  interpretation  of 
unemployment as an essentially frictional phenomenon is a by-product of his approach to the 
long-run  and short-run  effects of technical progress. The starting point was his study of the 
consequences of the introduction of labour-saving innovations – the famous machinery problem 
formulated by Ricardo and carefully discussed by Marx, Wicksell and Hicks. This is hardly 
surprising,  since  it  was  in  the  machinery  chapter  that  Ricardo  ([1821]  1951,  p.  387,  top) 
advanced the Schumpeterian theme of the temporary profit captured by the entrepreneur who 
introduces the innovation into the system (see Schumpeter 1954, p. 646; Morishima 1992, pp. 
43-44).  It  may  look  paradoxical  that,  having  rejected  the  explanation  of  unemployment  by 
permanent displacement effects of new machinery, Schumpeter would focus on technological 
unemployment as the main dimension of unemployment in capitalism. However, this apparent 
paradox is easily solved once Schumpeter’s account of the reallocation process in the business 
cycle is taken into account.  
The dismissal or neglect of Schumpeter’s approach to unemployment in the economic 
literature of the 1940s and 1950s was founded on the notion that unemployment could not be 
explained by frictions. A case in point was Alexander Gourvitch ([1940] 1966, pp. 188-90) who, 
in  his  classic  book,  criticized  Schumpeter’s  notion  that  technological  unemployment  is 
“ephemeral”, on the grounds that it depended on Schumpeter’s unproven assumption that the 
system eventually converges to normal equilibrium unemployment. The view on Schumpeter 
changed dramatically in the early 1990s, when his concept of creative destruction became central 
not just to the microeconomic analysis of competition (as it had been for some time), but to the 
macroeconomics of the labour market as well.  
 
Similarities and Differences between Schumpeter and the Neo-Schumpeterians 
Our illustration of the systemic relations in Schumpeter’s taxonomy of unemployment (in the 
figure above) helps to highlight important similarities and differences between Schumpeter’s 
views and models of frictional unemployment in the Neo-Schumpeterian literature. As indicated 
above  and explained  below, there  is  a terminological  correspondence  between  Schumpeter’s 
approach and Neo-Schumpeterian writings in terms of close links between creative destruction 
and frictional unemployment. Yet, to our knowledge, there is no single approach in the modern 
literature that captures all of Schumpeter’s subdivisions of frictional unemployment. This may be 
the price to pay for a substantial change in methodology. Schumpeter’s views were based on 
purely verbal reasoning about complex relationships between statics and dynamics in economic 
analysis.  That  dichotomy  helped  him  nevertheless  to  distinguish  rather  clearly  between  the 
disequilibrium phenomena of technological and cyclical unemployment on the one hand, and the 
equilibrium  phenomena  of  normal  and  vicarious  unemployment  on  the  other.  Neo-
Schumpeterian  models  discuss  unemployment  generally  in  a  dynamic  general  equilibrium 
setting. However, keeping such models tractable requires a reduction of complexity that does 
not, at present, seem to allow for taking into account all of aspects of frictional unemployment 
addressed by Schumpeter.      
  Yet  modern  modeling  techniques  do  also  help  to  substantiate  as  well  as  modify 
Schumpeter’s intuitive insights. A case in point is Schumpeter’s assertion of the stationarity of 
long-run unemployment (see section 2). Schumpeter’s unemployment series ([1946] 1951, p.   15 
200) have been extended up to 1990 by Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1991, pp. 3-5). Like 
Schumpeter,  they  conclude  that  unemployment  is  untrended  over  the  very  long  term.  Such 
empirical evidence has led some authors to regard the absence of long-run effects of the level of 
productivity on the steady-state (or “natural”) rate of unemployment as one of the conditions that 
any unemployment model should satisfy (Blanchard and Katz 1997, p. 56). It should be pointed 
out,  however,  that  Schumpeter  did  not categorically exclude  the  possibility  that  productivity 
growth may affect unemployment in the long-run, especially if it comes along with imperfect 
competition. For him it was an empirical question, and there is a yet no consensus about the sign 
of the long-term correlation between unemployment and productivity (or GDP) growth, although 
zero correlation is often found (see e.g. Mortensen 2005).  
From  a  purely  theoretical  perspective,  the  relation  between  productivity  growth  and 
unemployment has been approached in two different ways in recent literature, depending on the 
assumption  about  the  character  of  technical  progress.  Under  the  assumption  of  disembodied 
technology, faster technological progress leads to more job creation in the steady state through 
the “capitalization” effect: since the costs of job creation are paid initially, faster technological 
progress means a lower effective discount rate on future profits and hence higher present value 
for profits (Pissarides 1990, ch. 2). If variations in the rate of job destruction are mostly high-
frequency (that is, they can be assumed to be constant across business cycles), the effect of faster 
growth in the disembodied case is to increase job creation and reduce unemployment. In the 
alternative vintage approach, the new technology is assumed to be embodied only in the capital 
at workplaces with newly created jobs. The notion that new technology cannot be adopted in 
existing jobs and that its introduction requires the creation of new jobs with new capital goods is 
close to Schumpeter’s approach. It implies that technical progress entails a transition of workers 
to unemployment and search for a job in the new firms. Therefore, faster technical progress 
brings about more labor reallocation and – because of frictions inherent to the working of the 
labor market – higher unemployment caused by lower job creation and higher job destruction 
flows.  This  effect  of  technical  progress  on  unemployment is,  with  reference  to Schumpeter, 
called “creative destruction” effect (Aghion and Howitt 1994, 1998, ch. 4; see also Mortensen 
and Pissarides 1999; Pissarides 2000, ch. 3, and Postel-Vinay 2002).  
It  is  worth  noting  that  modern  models  of  creative  destruction  do  not  challenge  the 
neoclassical view of Wicksell and Hicks, also adopted by Schumpeter, that the introduction of 
labor-saving methods has no long-term effects  on unemployment. As pointed out by Howitt 
(1994, p. 768), the mainstream view focuses upon the effect of a single technological innovation, 
or the introduction of a “general purpose technology”, not on the effects of an increase in the rate 
of technological progress.
13 Even if the workers displaced by a single innovation eventually find 
new jobs, “the faster the pace of job-destroying innovations the greater will be the flow into 
unemployment in any given situation, and therefore the greater will be the steady-state rate of 
unemployment”.  Schumpeter  was  aware  that  the  effects  of  a  constant  rate  of  technological 
progress  on  the  level  of  long-run  unemployment  would  be  permanent:  “[T]echnological 
unemployment,  even  if  essentially  temporary  so  far  as  the  effects  of  any  individual  act  of 
mechanization is concerned, may  evidently  become  a permanent phenomenon through being 
                                                 
13  Francois  and  Lloyd  Ellis  (2003,  2005)  deviate  from  this  view  to  model  the  emergence  of  high-
frequency cycles from the optimal clustering of innovations in a framework of entrepreneurial “animal 
spirits”. Their framework appears to be open to endogenous explanations of variations in the rate of 
technological progress, but does not deal with variations in the steady-state rate.     16 
incessantly recreated” (Schumpeter 1954, p. 944; see also the second quotation that opens this 
paper). However, except for a brief elliptic passage in the “lost chapter” of 1911, he did not 
discuss the effects of a faster rate of technological progress on long-run unemployment (that is, 
he did not compare different steady states). 
In the short-term perspective, the Neo-Schumpeterian literature has paid special attention 
to Schumpeter’s emphasis on the importance of recessions as a “spring cleaning” that paves the 
way  for  further  economic  development.  Caballero  and  Hammour  (1994,  1996,  2005)  have 
argued that, contrary to Schumpeter’s claim, the pace of the restructuring process may fall rather 
than  rise  during  contractions  because  of  impediments  to  creative  destruction.  Incomplete 
contracting between labor and capital can disrupt the synchronization between job creation and 
destruction  during  recessions  and  make  unemployment  higher  than  optimum.  However, 
Schumpeter was hardly oblivious to the fact that unemployment can reach levels higher than its 
“right” amount in the depression (even though contractual relations were not in his focus).  
 
 
6  Final remarks 
The core of Schumpeter’s views on unemployment is his notion of frictional unemployment 
caused by the introduction of innovations in the economy. In chapter 7 of the first edition of The 
Theory  of  Economic  Development  Schumpeter  identified  that  notion  as  the  component  of 
unemployment phenomena that could be explained by pure economic theory. Schumpeter kept 
that insight in his later work, but enlarged the basic framework by suggesting in the Business 
Cycles  a  new  taxonomy  including  also  forms  of  unemployment  associated  with  wage  push, 
imperfect competition and short-run downward shifts of the (new and old) firms’ demand curves 
for labor in the deep depression. Surely, as sometimes remarked by Schumpeter, all kinds of 
unemployment may be called frictional if one adopts a widely enough definition of “frictions”. 
However, only technological unemployment is essentially related to the “creative destruction” 
process envisaged by Schumpeter. Interestingly enough, in his controversy with Cassel it was the 
latter who adopted the view that passive labor market policies - by creating rigidities that affect 
negatively the ability of the labor market to adjust to technology shocks – were the main factor 
behind the persistently high unemployment rate in Europe in the 1920s. Later on, Schumpeter 
did emphasize labor market policies as a main contributing factor to high unemployment rates in 
the US in the mid and late 1930s, but his focus was not on their perverse effect on labor supply 
(as in Cassel), but on their negative impact on the profit expectations of entrepreneurs.    
  Even though Schumpeter’s views on unemployment as friction are remarkably coherent 
and  rich  in  structure,  one  may  see  some  apparent  loose  ends.  There  is,  for  example,  an 
inconsistency  between  his  life-long  insistence  on  the  general  validity  of  Say’s  law  and  his 
accounts  of  abnormal  depressions,  in  which  aggregate  demand for  goods and labor  falls  far 
below supply in a cumulative process – in Schumpeter’s defense, one could argue that his point 
was about the fragility of simple “over-production” theories of the underconsumption type. In the 
same vein, the corresponding notion of “depression unemployment” does not easily fit the purely 
frictional model, although it can be seen as part of the asset readjustment process prompted by 
technological change.  There is also an inconsistency between his insistence on the absence of an 
upward trend in unemployment and his pattern prediction of increasingly “quasi-monopoloid 
structures” in the course of economic development, as these would produce a tendency toward 
higher rates of normal unemployment in equilibrium. 
Yet the absence of an upward trend in unemployment can be defended with reference to   17 
Schumpeter’s  theory  of  creative  destruction.  In  his  Capitalism,  Socialism  and  Democracy 
([1942] 1952, chs. 5-8), Schumpeter developed the notion that monopolistic competition may 
increase the rate of growth through the intensity of creative destruction that he considered to be 
higher than in atomistic competition, in contrast with his earlier works (see Scherer 1992). He 
came to reject the orthodox view (partially supported in his 1939 book) that the level of output 
and employment over time is lower under monopolistic competition than in perfect competition 
([1952] 1942, pp. 80, 82). Furthermore, he argued that short-run price rigidities may help to 
mitigate the cyclical fluctuations of employment and output. This resembles in fact some old and 
new Keynesian views, though derived from a completely different framework of analysis. The 
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